Over博士を囲む思考心理学若手研究会
Over博士講演会The probability of counterfactuals
David
Over博士が、日本学術振興会（企画者：神戸女学院大学
山 祐嗣教授）の招きにより来日しました。
Over博士は英国Durham大学心理学科の教授であり、哲学的な論理の研究から出発して、近年は、Evans博士とともに、推論、判断、意思決定の心理学および進化心理学に関する共同研究を進めています。
http://www.dur.ac.uk/psychology/staff/?id=4610（現在のＨＰ）
http://www.sunderland.ac.uk/~bs0sco/psyweb/davidover.htm（前任校のＨＰ）
二人の本は、ナカニシヤから下記の翻訳が出ています。
Jonathan St.B.T. Evans & David E. Over「合理性と推理―人間は合理的な思考が可能か」
Over博士は日本で、札幌、東京、大阪などで複数の講演を予定していますが、京都大学では、下記の通り、前半は、若手対象（院生、若手研究者など）の小人数の密度の濃い研究会、後半は講演会を おこないました。
日時 2007年４月３日 火曜日
場所 京都大学教育学部
アクセス・地図http://www.educ.kyoto-u.ac.jp/access.htm
スケジュール
1:30-3:30 Over先生を囲む若手研究会（２F215室）
小宮あすか（京大教育新M２）
"Cultural differences of regret under interpersonal and
personal situation :US-Japan comparison.
田中優子（京大教育新D２）
The degree of belief in implicit assumption and the evaluation of
enthymeme.
服部郁子（立命館大学心理）
A Role of Causal Strength in
Naive Reasoning
コメンテイター
David Over
4:30-6:00 Over先生講演会（１F第1講義室）
タイトル：The probability of counterfactuals
Counterfactual conditionals are of great interest in philosophy and psychology. These conditionals appear closely related to statements about causation and dispositions, and also to intense human feelings of regret and relief. Yet basic philosophical and psychological questions about them do not have agreed answers. There is not an accepted normative logical system for counterfactuals, and cognitive psychologists have only just started to investigate people’s actual counterfactual reasoning. One basic question is about the relation between counterfactual and indicative conditionals. I will try to clarify this relation by discussing inferences from disjunctive statements. Another basic question is how people come to have a degree of confidence in counterfactuals. I will describe psychological research with my collaborators that attempts to answer this question. In our theory, a counterfactual conditional, “if p had been the case, then q would have been”, is closely related to an indicative conditional, “if p then q”, stated earlier in time. The subjective probability of the counterfactual is the probability of the indicative conditional at that earlier time. The subjective probability of the indicative is itself determined by a process of hypothetical thought, which has the result that its probability is the conditional subjective probability of q given p. I will review the experimental evidence for this theory and discuss its problems and limitations.
問い合わせ先
楠見 孝
Kusumi(at)educ.kyoto-u.ac.jp
2007.4.6